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E-mail address: vanessa.beanland@anu.edu.au (V.Inattentional blindness (IB) describes the failure to notice salient but unexpected stimuli when attention
is partially engaged by another task. Few studies have explicitly investigated the role of eye movements
in IB and the relative contributions of overt and covert attention. We recorded eye movements in a series
of IB experiments using dynamic stimuli. Results indicate that eye movements do not predict IB; noticers
and nonnoticers were equally likely to ﬁxate on or near the unexpected item, often for similar durations.
Perceptual load also determines whether observers will ﬁxate the unexpected object. In a high perceptual
load task, IB was high (81%) and most participants did not allocate overt attention to the unexpected
object. Under lower perceptual load IB decreased to 54% and both noticers and nonnoticers ﬁxated on
the unexpected object.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Detecting sudden changes in our environment has a clear evo-
lutionary advantage: it heightens our responsiveness to potentially
threatening events by allowing us time to react. It is therefore
counterintuitive, and lacks biological sense, that we frequently
experience clear and obvious events in our visual world that we
simply fail to see. This failure to notice a salient but unexpected
stimulus when attention is engaged by another task is known as
inattentional blindness (IB; Mack & Rock, 1998). IB is a highly robust
effect and has been consistently demonstrated using static (Cart-
wright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Koivisto, Hyönä, & Revonsuo, 2004;
Mack & Rock, 1998; White & Aimola Davies, 2008) and dynamic
computerized displays (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008; Koivisto &
Revonsuo, 2008; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005; Most, Si-
mons, Scholl, & Chabris, 2000; Most et al., 2001; Simons & Jensen,
2009) as well as ‘‘real-world” videos (Neisser, 1979; Simons & Cha-
bris, 1999). Spatial factors can inﬂuence whether observers notice
an unexpected stimulus; rates of IB increase (i.e., noticing de-
creases) with distance from the focus of attention (Mack & Rock,
1998; Most et al., 2000; Newby & Rock, 1998). However, IB can oc-
cur when the unexpected stimulus appears directly in the obser-
ver’s zone of attention (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2000), so
spatial attention alone is insufﬁcient to explain IB. Other factors
that can inﬂuence IB rates include the observer’s attentional set
(Most et al., 2001, 2005; White & Aimola Davies, 2008), the percep-
tual load or difﬁculty of the primary task (Cartwright-Finch & La-ll rights reserved.
Beanland).vie, 2007; Simons & Jensen, 2009; White & Aimola Davies, 2008),
and the presence of distractors (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008).
Traditionally many IB studies required participants to ﬁxate on
a speciﬁc point in order to control for eye movements and visual
input (e.g., Mack & Rock, 1998). In most of these experiments the
unexpected object appeared at or moved past ﬁxation, demonstrat-
ing that IB can occur for objects that appear foveally (Mack & Rock,
1998; Most et al., 2000, 2001, 2005). Even if observers cannot con-
sciously report the unexpected stimulus, the fact that it appeared
at ﬁxation indicates that some level of visual processing must have
occurred. However, the perceptual fate of undetected stimuli in an
IB situation remains unknown. In many cases the unexpected stim-
ulus is highly salient and would be expected to explicitly capture
attention, such as a red cross in an otherwise monochromatic dis-
play (Most et al., 2001). It is possible that observers process some
elements of the unexpected stimulus and consequently reject it as
irrelevant. Evidence suggests unexpected stimuli undergo process-
ing to the level of semantic content; observers are more likely to
detect emotionally salient stimuli such as happy faces or their
own name (Mack & Rock, 1998), or stimuli that belong to the same
semantic category as relevant attended items (Koivisto & Revo-
nsuo, 2007, 2009; Koivisto et al., 2004). In the case of personal
names, small changes in lettering (i.e., Susan/Sosan) signiﬁcantly
decrease the chance of detection (Mack & Rock, 1998). Other evi-
dence indicates that the perceptual grouping required for the Pon-
zo and Müller-Lyer illusions can occur under conditions of
inattention (Moore & Egeth, 1997). Such results suggest that a
sophisticated level of processing occurs for unattended stimuli,
yet the details fail to be transmitted to consciousness. Similarly,
undetected words can prime subsequent responses in word-stem
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choice paradigms as a measure of implicit processing provides
mixed results. In some studies participants correctly identify unex-
pected stimuli at or below chance level (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie,
2007; Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock, 1992; Rock, Linnett, Grant,
& Mack, 1992), whereas in other studies they perform signiﬁcantly
above chance (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008; Mack & Rock, 1998).
Overall this evidence suggests that although IB paradigms mea-
sure explicit attentional capture (Simons, 2000), undetected stimuli
in an IB situation may capture attention implicitly. This raises the
question of why some unexpected stimuli do not reach awareness.
Conscious identiﬁcation of a stimulus requires attentional orient-
ing and selective attention, which can occur by either covertly or
overtly bringing a stimulus into the zone of attention. Using covert
attention we can be aware of a stimulus without looking directly at
it, or we can simultaneously employ overt and covert attention to
examine two stimuli concurrently (see Most et al. (2005) and Pos-
ner (1980), for extensive discussions). Covert attention does not in-
volve an explicit eye movement towards the stimulus, so
attentional orienting is not necessarily dependent on eye move-
ments. By contrast, eye movements depend on both covert and
overt attentional allocation. Covert orienting of attention occurs
approximately 100 ms before we move our eyes (Posner & Peter-
sen, 1990) and covertly shifting attention increases responsiveness
to stimuli appearing in that location (Posner, 1980). Overt atten-
tion may facilitate processing of a target by increasing acuity (Pos-
ner & Petersen, 1990), but if high acuity is not necessary for target
identiﬁcation then covert attention is sufﬁcient and foveating a
stimulus may not yield any beneﬁts (Posner, 1980). Most et al.
(2005) reformulated Neisser’s perceptual cycle framework to
accommodate these processes in an IB context. The framework in-
volves a cognitive network of iterative feedback loops, which are
initially instigated by bottom-up stimulus features that attract
automatic orienting. Feedback loops assess the relevance of the
stimulus with respect to the observer’s attentional set, which in
turn produce covert and/or overt attentional shifts that ultimately
give rise to conscious awareness (Most et al., 2005). This model of
IB is embryonic, but not dissimilar to models for other attentional
phenomena suggesting similar iterative feedback loops based on a
mental template, such as the recent ‘‘boost and bounce” theory for
attentional blink (Olivers & Meeter, 2008).
An unexpected stimulus is most at the mercy of an orienting
mechanism. Because it is unexpected, strategic attentional shifts
cannot be executed until it has been detected through the bot-
tom-up processing of some salient featural quality. One potential
method to explore this issue is to examine the eye movements
generated by a participant. It is reasonably well established that
attentional capture inﬂuences saccades towards a target (see Liv-
ersedge and Findlay (2000) and Rayner (2009), for reviews). Anom-
alous stimuli in a natural visual scene can speed up the execution
and processing of a saccade (Becker, Pashler, & Lubin, 2007; Ray-
ner, Castelhano, & Yang, 2009), a peripheral cue can elicit attention
during ﬁxation resulting in enhanced discrimination at the cue
location (Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, & Irwin, 1998), and a remote
distractor can result in an unattended saccade towards the distrac-
tor (Walker, Deubel, Schneider, & Findlay, 1997). These results sug-
gest the visual qualities of an unusual or unexpected object can be
processed by a covert attentional mechanism, which provides in-
put to initiate an eye movement and subsequent overt attentional
processing. Therefore patterns of eye movements in IB could reveal
whether an unexpected stimulus captures attention overtly and
the extent to which it is processed. Of course, monitoring eye
movements as an index of early attentional coding still does not
obviate the possibility that covert attentional mechanisms are in
play; an unexpected stimulus could be processed covertly and re-
jected as irrelevant based on some visual aspect, without initiatingan eye movement. However, given that shifts of covert attention
are required for shifts of overt attention (Shepherd, Findlay, &
Hockey, 1986), if participants do saccade to the unexpected stimu-
lus without consciously perceiving it, this suggests that covert and
overt attentional capture occurred and that preconscious process-
ing led to the stimulus being suppressed. Conversely if no saccadic
movement is made towards the unexpected stimulus, then either
the stimulus was rejected by covert attentional processes, or it
did not capture attention. The latter seems unlikely given the ﬁnd-
ings that unexpected stimuli are processed semantically even
when participants cannot report noticing them (Koivisto & Revo-
nsuo, 2007, 2009; Koivisto et al., 2004; Mack & Rock, 1998).
Despite the potential implications of this, very few studies have
examined the role of eye movements in IB. In a static experiment
by Koivisto et al. (2004) rates of IB did not vary depending on pat-
terns of eye movements; nearly one third of participants who were
allowed tomove their eyes looked directly at the unexpected stimu-
lus, but most still did not report consciously perceiving it (Koivisto
et al., 2004). Similar patterns of eyemovements were observed dur-
ing noncritical trials, however, suggesting that the unexpected stim-
ulus did not capture observers’ eyes or preconscious attention but
rather that participants had a tendency to move their eyes back to
the ﬁxation point, which was where the unexpected item appeared.
There are nevertheless two intriguing ﬁndings in Koivisto et al.’s
(2004) study: that eye movements do not differ between noticers
and nonnoticers and that participants can directly ﬁxate an object
without noticing it. Comparable results have been found using dy-
namic stimuli.Memmert (2006) recorded children’s eyemovements
while they viewed Simons and Chabris’ (1999) ‘‘gorilla” video and
found no differences in ﬁxation locations when comparing noticers
and nonnoticers of the gorilla. Typically, all children ﬁxated on the
gorilla for up to one second (Memmert, 2006), supporting Koivisto
et al.’s (2004) result that it is possible to ﬁxate on an unexpected
stimulus without consciously noticing it. However, Memmert’s
(2006) ﬁndings have limited generalizability because childrenwere
used as participants. Young children are less susceptible to IB than
older childrenor adults,whichmaybe related to insufﬁcient engage-
ment in the primary task (Neisser, 1979), and there is evidence that
ability to control overt attention and eye movements develops and
changes subtly over time (Kramer, Gonzalez de Sather, & Cassav-
augh, 2005). Further, in the task used observers must count passes
that occur around the centre of the screen so, rather than attending
to the gorilla, participants may have been ﬁxating centrally in order
to easilymonitor thepasses in that region. Finally, thevideodoesnot
allow any control or comparison to determine the extent to which
thepresenceof theunexpected stimulus inﬂuencedeyemovements.
For these reasons, in order to properly understand the role that eye
movements play in sustained inattentional blindness, it is necessary
to use dynamic stimuli that allow greater control of the display and
to test this stimuli in an adult population.
The current study used a computerized sustained IB paradigm,
whichwas establishedbyMost et al. (2000, 2001, 2005) and adapted
by other researchers (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008; Koivisto & Revo-
nsuo, 2008; Simons & Jensen, 2009). The paradigm consists of two
subsets of shapes that differ on some dimension, usually color and/
or shape, which move at varied speeds and occasionally ‘‘bounce”
off the edges of the display. Participants are instructed to track one
shape subset, for example by counting how many times the shapes
bounce during each trial. On critical inattention trials an unexpected
stimulus appears, usually traveling horizontally across the display
and exiting before the end of the trial (but see Koivisto & Revonsuo,
2008). By systematically manipulating characteristics of the unex-
pected stimuli, Most et al. (2005) used the sustained IB paradigm
todemonstrate that attentional set candeterminewhetheranobser-
verwill notice unexpected objects. If the situation requires anobser-
ver to have a speciﬁc attentional set (e.g., attend squares, ignore
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their attentional set (i.e., another square) but not one that falls out-
side it, even if the item is featurally distinct (i.e., a uniquely colored
circle).Attentional set appearsextremelypowerful in termsofdeter-
mining what will explicitly capture awareness, with research ﬁnd-
ings indicating that observers can adopt attentional sets for
expected luminance (Most et al., 2001, 2005) and shape of stimuli
as well as more complex features such as racial identity of faces
(Most et al., 2005). Additionally, static IB experiments have demon-
strated the existence of attentional sets for the expected number
(White & Aimola Davies, 2008) and semantic category of stimuli
(Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007, 2009; Koivisto et al., 2004). Bottom-
up salience remains inﬂuential, however; when both unattended
and attended subsets of shapes have the same color (e.g., black cir-
cles and squares), an unexpected item of distinctive color and shape
will be more likely to capture attention than an object that has dis-
tinct shape alone (i.e., white triangle vs. black triangle).
We sought to expand on current ﬁndings from the sustained IB
literature by adapting this computerized dynamic paradigm for use
in conjunction with an eyetracker. Through a series of experiments
we investigated the role of eye movements in sustained IB by com-
paring results for participants who noticed the unexpected stimu-
lus to those who did not notice it (or were not presented with it).2. Experiment 1A
Most sustained IB research using computerized stimuli has re-
quired participants to ﬁxate their eyes on a speciﬁc point (e.g.,
Most et al., 2000, 2001, 2005). Some studies allowed participants
to freely move their eyes and results indicate this may subtly alter
the nature of inattentional blindness. Using a no-ﬁxation design,
Bressan and Pizzighello (2008) demonstrated that attentional re-
sources were drawn away from the primary task only for nonnotic-
ers who failed to report the unexpected stimulus. When they
introduced a ﬁxation point, accuracy on the primary task did not
differ between noticers or nonnoticers of the unexpected stimulus
(Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008). However, they did not measure eye
movements to determine whether the decrease in primary task
accuracy resulted from nonnoticers looking toward the unexpected
stimulus and away from the bouncing objects, which would sup-
port their claim that the ‘‘unseen” unexpected stimulus recruited
attentional resources. In Experiment 1A we manipulated whether
participants were required to ﬁxate or allowed to move their eyes,
with eye movements recorded to ensure participants followed
instructions. Half the participants were required to ﬁxate and half
were allowed to move their eyes freely. Further, we investigated
the role that eye movements play in sustained IB by examining
whether eye movements differ between noticers and nonnoticers.
Traditionally IB experiments contain only one critical trial (Koivis-
to & Revonsuo, 2008; Most et al., 2000, 2001, 2005) on the assump-
tion that the critical trial may implicitly alert the participant to the
unexpected stimulus even if they failed to notice it, removing the
element of nonexpectation. More recently it has been demon-
strated that two critical trials can be included if different stimuli
are used as the unexpected stimulus each time and if the partici-
pant is not questioned about the unexpected items until after the
second critical trial (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008). We used an IB
task with two critical trials to enable more opportunities for com-
parison between noticers and nonnoticers.2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Eighty undergraduates participated voluntarily, either for a
class activity or course credit. Eight participants were excludeddue to: realizing the experimental topic (3); extensive previous
knowledge of IB (1); failure to follow instructions (1); failure to re-
port the unexpected stimulus under full attention (1); experi-
menter error (1); and poor vision (1). The remaining 72
participants (71% female; Mage = 21.4 years, SD = 4.6) were evenly
distributed across two experimental conditions. All participants
provided informed consent and had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity, as measured by accuracy on a Snellen chart.
2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Eye movements were monitored using a Cambridge Research
Systems Video Eyetracker Toolbox system incorporating a headrest
and ﬁxed 50 Hz camera with a resolution of 0.1 and accuracy of
0.5–0.25. Visual stimuli were presented on computer using a
21” CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 85 Hz and screen resolution
of 1024  768 pixels. Stimuli were programmed using Presentation
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). The stimulus display area con-
sisted of a grey background (luminance 57 cd/m2) subtending
28.8  21.6 visual angle, with a small (0.2  0.2) dark grey
(24 cd/m2) ﬁxation dot in the centre. Four black (6 cd/m2; Weber
contrast 0.89) and four white (90 cd/m2; Weber contrast 0.58)
‘L’ and ‘T’ shapes (1.6  1.6) moved around the screen at different
speeds, traveling in straight paths until reaching the edge and then
‘‘bouncing” off the edge of the display window. Each item bounced
3–8 times per trial, with the white items bouncing a total of 19–26
times per trial (M = 21.4, SD = 2.7).
The experiment consisted of six 15 s trials, presented in the
same order for each participant. Control trials (trials 1, 2 and 4) con-
tained only the black and white letter shapes. Critical trials (trials 3
and 5) and the full attention trial (trial 6) also contained an extra
item, the unexpected stimulus (US; see Fig. 1). The US was dark
grey (24 cd/m2; Weber contrast 0.58; size 1.6  1.6) in color
and was either a symbol or letter shape: ‘+’ in trial 3; ‘X’ in trial
5; and ‘H’ in trial 6. The US entered from the right display edge
and traveled horizontally along the midline, exiting to the left.
The US appeared after 5 s and exited at 10 s.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dark room, with their
head stabilized by the eyetracker chinrest at a viewing distance of
75 cm. Prior to beginning the experimental trials, the eyetracker
was calibrated to each individual participant’s gaze. All partici-
pants were informed that the experiment was assessing their ob-
ject-tracking ability. In the eyes-ﬁxating condition participants
were instructed to ﬁxate on the central ﬁxation point. In the
eyes-moving condition, participants were instructed to move their
eyes as much as necessary in order to accurately track the objects.
After each trial, participants were asked to report the number of
times the white letters bounced. Participants were not questioned
about the US until after the second critical trial. US noticers were
asked to describe its shape, color, speed and movement, and indi-
cate during which trials it had appeared. They were then shown a
forced-choice sheet containing eight shapes and asked to identify
which shapes they had seen during the experiment. The shapes
(A, E, F, H, X, Y, =, and +) were chosen for their featural similarity
to the US shapes. Nonnoticers were informed that some trials con-
tained extra items and asked to choose which shapes might have
appeared using the same forced-choice sheet shown to noticers.
No limit was placed on the number of choices a participant could
make. The full attention trial took place after participants had been
questioned about the unexpected stimuli. Participants were in-
structed not to count the bounces and to simply watch the display;
eyes-ﬁxating participants were reminded to maintain ﬁxation. Par-
ticipants who could not correctly report the color, shape and mo-
tion of the unexpected stimulus under conditions of full
attention were excluded from subsequent analyses. Finally, during
Fig. 1. Sequence of trials. The ﬁrst two trials contained only expected objects. Trial 3 was the ﬁrst critical trial, containing ‘ + ’ in Experiment 1A and ‘A’ in Experiment 2. Trial 4
again contained no unexpected stimulus. Trial 5 was the second critical trial, containing ‘X’ in Experiment 1A and ‘=’ in Experiment 2. After trial 5 participants were
questioned to determine whether they had noticed the US on either critical trial. Trial 6 was the full attention trial, with participants instructed to simply watch the screen
without performing the bounce-counting task.
980 V. Beanland, K. Pammer / Vision Research 50 (2010) 977–988debrieﬁng participants were questioned to determine whether
they had any prior knowledge of IB research paradigms and partic-
ipants with excessive IB knowledge were excluded.2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Behavioral data
Nearly 20% of participants reported noticing the US on one or
both of the critical trials. Rates of noticing did not differ signiﬁ-
cantly between the eyes-ﬁxating (25%) and eyes-moving condi-
tions (14%), v2(1, N = 72) = 1.42, p = .372, 2-sided, suggesting that
IB does not differ whether observers are ﬁxating or moving their
eyes, contrary to the results of Bressan and Pizzighello (2008).
Among noticers, most participants noticed the US either on the
second critical trial or both critical trials, with only 4% noticing
on the ﬁrst but not the second critical trial (see Table 1). Anecdot-
ally, those who reported noticing the US once typically insisted
that it only appeared once.
The primary bounce-counting task proved highly demanding
and most participants underreported the number of bounces by
at least 10%, with the average error rate across all trials around
21%. Eyes-ﬁxating participants reported consistently lowerTable 1
Experiment 1A rates of noticing the unexpected stimulus, by condition.
Experimental condition Overall
(%)
Eyes-
ﬁxating
(%)
Eyes-
moving
(%)
Noticed?
Trial 3 only (ﬁrst critical trial) 3 6 4
Trial 5 only (second critical trial 14 6 10
Both trials 3 and 5 (all critical trials) 8 3 6
Total noticers 25 14 19
Inattentional blindness 75 86 81
Note: Percentages have been rounded so total noticers may not equal the sum of the
column.bounce-counts compared to eyes-moving participants on all trials
except the ﬁrst, suggesting that nonﬁxating participants were able
to adopt more effective tracking strategies after the ﬁrst trial. For
this reason, trial 1 was considered a practice trial and data from
this trial were not further analyzed. Accuracy scores for all other
trials were compared using 2 (condition: eyes-moving vs. eyes-ﬁx-
ating)  2 (IB: nonnoticers vs. noticers) between-subjects ANOVA.
As shown in Table 2, there was a main effect of condition for all tri-
als except the fourth, which had the highest number of bounces
and the highest error scores. There were no main effects for IB
and no signiﬁcant interactions, indicating that bounce-counting
scores do not systematically differ between noticers and
nonnoticers.
All noticers and 69% of nonnoticers correctly identiﬁed at least
one US shape (+ and/or X) using the forced-choice sheet, which
could tentatively be interpreted as indicative of implicit processing
or priming. However, nearly three-quarters of nonnoticers also
chose at least one incorrect shape. Most nonnoticers (55%) chose
two shapes on the forced-choice sheet (M = 1.7, SD = 0.6). The most
common choice was +, identiﬁed by 57% of nonnoticers. Other pop-
ular choices were F (29%), H (28%) and X (21%). The least-chosen
shapes were A (2%), = (10%), E (12%) and Y (12%). Almost all notic-
ers chose correct shapes exclusively; the only incorrect shape cho-
sen by noticers was Y (14%).2.2.2. Eye movements
Data from the eyes-ﬁxating condition were checked to ensure
that participants maintained ﬁxation, but only the eyes-moving
condition was fully analyzed. Data were screened and assessed
for quality and continuity of recording. Most trials contained some
missing data, typically due to blinks (which were allowed) or rapid
eye movements across a large area (which sometimes resulted in a
brief loss of signal). Since the nature of the experiment meant trials
could not be repeated or interrupted, eye movement data from
eight participants were discarded from the eyes-moving condition
due to poor recording (i.e., <80% tracked). Of the remaining 28 par-
ticipants, 3 noticed the US on the ﬁrst critical trial and 3 noticed
Table 2
Experiment 1A bounce-counting mean accuracy (and standard deviations), by condition.
Eyes-ﬁxating Eyes-moving Tests of between-subjects effects
Nonnoticers Noticers Nonnoticers Noticers Condition IB Condition  IB
Trial 2 (control trial) 4.8 (3.6) 3.6 (3.4) 2.6 (2.6) 1.6 (2.1) F(1,68) = 4.69, p = .034* F(1,68) = 1.44, p = .234 F(1,68) = 0.01, p = .926
Trial 3 (critical trial) 4.5 (3.6) 3.7 (3.2) 2.2 (2.9) 1.0 (1.4) F(1,68) = 6.39, p = .014* F(1,68) = 1.10, p = .298 F(1,68) = 0.05, p = .834
Trial 4 (control trial) 7.6 (3.5) 6.8 (4.5) 5.5 (3.4) 5.2 (3.0) F(1,68) = 2.79, p = .100 F(1,68) = 0.30, p = .586 F(1,68) = 0.05, p = .819
Trial 5 (critical trial) 5.4 (2.5) 5.8 (3.4) 3.3 (2.6) 4.2 (3.6) F(1,68) = 4.72, p = .033* F(1,68) = 0.61, p = .437 F(1,68) = 0.09, p = .766
Note: Scores are difference scores (actual – reported bounces) so lower scores indicate greater accuracy. Between-subjects tests were calculated using SPSS Univariate General
Linear Model.
* p < .05.
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eyetracker at 20 ms intervals. Each participant’s gaze location was
compared to the US location for each recorded time point and a
distance score (i.e., distance from ﬁxation to US) was computed.
Fig. 2 depicts example output showing the horizontal and vertical
traces (deviation from ﬁxation), comparing a noticer and a nonno-
ticer on a critical trial, as well as a full attention trial. The shaded
regions indicate periods where the observer was looking within
2 of the US: in Fig. 2A the noticer tracked the US twice; in
Fig. 2B the nonnoticer ﬁxated within the trajectory of the US;
and in Fig. 2C the observer tracked the stimulus intermittently
throughout the full attention trial. In order to get a general mea-
sure of how far each participant’s gaze was from the US, these
scores were used to compute the average distance of between each
participant’s ﬁxation location and the US for the 5 s period that the
US was fully visible on screen. Within the eyes-moving condition,
there were no signiﬁcant differences in gaze distance from the
US comparing noticers and nonnoticers for the ﬁrst (nonnoticers:
M = 11.9, SD = 1.4; noticers: M = 10.3, SD = 1.3; t(26) = 1.83,
p = .078, CI95 [0.2, 3.3]) or second critical trial (nonnoticers:
M = 11.1, SD = 1.6; noticers: M = 10.2, SD = 1.0; t(26) = 0.99,
p = .331, CI95 [1.0, 2.9]). For the full attention trial the average
gaze distance from the US was 4.6 (SD = 1.9), due to the tendency
of participants to directly track the US for at least part of the ﬁnal
trial (see Fig. 2C).
Initially participants were classiﬁed as looking at the US if they
ﬁxated directly on the US location for at least 80 ms. However, the
data revealed that very few participants (614% on either trial)
looked directly at the US so a further set of measures were calcu-
lated for gaze duration near the US. Participants were considered
to have looked near the US if they ﬁxated within 1, 2, 3 or 4 vi-
sual angle of the US for at least 80 ms. The maximum value of 4
was chosen because it places the US within one saccade of ﬁxation,
based on an average saccade size of 4–5 for scene perception and
search tasks (Rayner, 2009). As shown in Table 3, noticers were no
more likely than nonnoticers to look near the US on either the ﬁrst
or the second critical trial. In addition, on both trials nonnoticers
looked directly at the location of the US. Fig. 3 presents the average
time spent looking either directly at (i.e., 0 from the US) or near
(i.e., 1–4 from the US) the US for noticers compared to nonnotic-
ers. The values for noticers should be interpreted cautiously, how-
ever, given the small number of participants represented (n 6 3),
especially for the second critical trial where there is great
variability.
In addition to this, we examined the time at which observers
ﬁrst looked at near the US. During the ﬁrst critical trial, for both
nonnoticers and noticers this was typically 1450–1600 ms after
its entrance, between two white letter bounces on diagonally
opposite sides of the display when observers would have been
shifting their overt attention to detect the location of the next
bounce. During the second critical trial, it was approximately
1650 ms after its entrance for noticers and around 2150–2300 ms
after its entrance for nonnoticers. In both cases, this was betweentwo white bounces that occurred vertically opposite each other, so
observers would have been in the process of shifting their atten-
tion from the bottom of the screen to the top and necessarily
would have intersected the midline where the US appeared.
Eye movements were also not related to shape choices. Partici-
pants who chose the correct US shape were no more likely to look
at or near the US during the critical trials. On the ﬁrst critical trial,
46% of those who looked directly at the US chose the correct shape
(+) from the forced-choice sheet, compared to 62% of those who did
not look at the US, v2(1, N = 64) = 1.75, p = .212, 2-sided. The US
shape for the second critical trial (X) was chosen by 40% of those
who looked directly at the US and 25% of those who did not,
v2(1, N = 64) = 1.50, p = .282, 2-sided. This ﬁnding, that several par-
ticipants looked directly at the US without consciously reporting it
or even guessing the correct shape, contradicts the suggestion that
correct shape choices indicate implicit processing.
Overall our data from Experiment 1A suggests that eye move-
ments do not necessarily differ between noticers and nonnoticers,
supporting previous IB research using different experimental para-
digms (Koivisto et al., 2004; Memmert, 2006). In particular, our
data indicate that noticers and nonnoticers are equally likely to
make saccades close to unexpected items, suggesting that the US
may implicitly capture observers’ attention irrespective of whether
they consciously notice it. However, the small number of noticers
in Experiment 1A and the large variability demand further evi-
dence to fully support this suggestion.3. Experiment 1B
One possible explanation for the results of Experiment 1A is
that neither noticers nor nonnoticers were speciﬁcally making a
saccade to the unexpected stimulus, but rather they were looking
at or near its location because they were tracking items that
bounced nearby. As such, the similarity in eye movements between
noticers and nonnoticers could be epiphenomenal. To investigate
this possibility we conducted a follow-up, Experiment 1B, in which
participants were not presented with an unexpected stimulus. The
primary task was identical to Experiment 1A in terms of stimuli
and movements (i.e., number and pattern of bounces) except that
no unexpected stimulus appeared. The major reason for this was
to determine whether primary task accuracy and patterns of eye
movements were affected by the presence of the unexpected stim-
ulus. If the similarity of eye movements between noticers and non-
noticers was indeed an epiphenomenon then we should ﬁnd no
difference in either eye movements or behavioral measures be-
tween participants in Experiments 1A and 1B.3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Ten postgraduate students (80% female; Mage = 26.8 years,
SD = 3.8) participated voluntarily and were offered AU$5
Fig. 2. Example eyetracker output, showing: (A) a noticer on a critical trial; (B) a nonnoticer on a critical trial; (C) a full attention trial. For each, the top pane indicates
horizontal trace and the bottom pane indicates vertical trace. Both traces indicate deviation from ﬁxation in degrees of visual angle. ‘‘Time” refers to the time relative to the
unexpected stimulus (US) entrance. The dotted diagonal line shows the US trajectory; since the US traveled horizontally along the midline its vertical position was constant at
0. Shaded regions indicate times when the observer’s gaze was within 2 of the US.
982 V. Beanland, K. Pammer / Vision Research 50 (2010) 977–988
Table 3
Experiment 1A percentage of participants looking at or near the unexpected stimulus.
Nonnoticersa (%) Noticersb (%) Signiﬁcance
Critical trial 1 (trial 3)
Looking at US 8 0 p = 1.000
Within 1 36 0 p = .530
Within 2 72 33 p = .234
Within 3 88 67 p = .382
Within 4 96 100 p = 1.000
Critical trial 2 (trial 5)
Looking at US 12 33 p = .382
Within 1 32 67 p = .284
Within 2 36 67 p = .543
Within 3 48 67 p = 1.000
Within 4 60 67 p = 1.000
Note: Fisher’s Exact Tests (2-sided) were calculated in SPSS because all comparisons
contained at least one cell with an expected value less than 5.
a n = 25.
b n = 3.
Table 4
Experiment 1B vs. 1A bounce-counting mean accuracy (and standard deviations).
Trial No US (Exp. 1B) US (Exp. 1A) Signiﬁcance
Trial 2 (control) 3.0 (2.6) 2.5 (2.5) t(44) = 0.55, p = .583
Trial 3 (critical) 2.1 (3.0) 2.1 (2.7) t(44) = 0.05, p = .965
Trial 4 (control) 4.8 (2.9) 5.5 (3.3) t(44) = 0.61, p = .546
Trial 5 (critical) 4.2 (2.3) 3.4 (2.7) t(44) = 0.83, p = .409
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had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.3.1.2. Apparatus, stimuli and procedure
The apparatus, procedure and stimuli were identical to the
eyes-moving condition in Experiment 1A, with one exception: no
unexpected stimuli appeared during the ﬁrst ﬁve trials. Only the ﬁ-
nal full attention trial contained an unexpected object.3.2. Results
3.2.1. Behavioral data
Rates of inattentional blindness are not applicable since there
was no US to notice. All participants noticed the US on the ﬁnal full
attention trial. As with Experiment 1A, participants tended to
underreport the number of bounces on all trials. Comparisons with
the eyes-moving group from Experiment 1A indicated no differ-
ences in bounce-counting accuracy between groups (see Table 4).
This suggests that in this experiment, at least, primary task accu-
racy was not affected by the mere presence of the US. The + was
again the most popular choice for the US shape. There were no sig-
niﬁcant differences in the patterns of shape choices between
Experiment 1B and the nonnoticers from Experiment 1A (see
Table 5).Fig. 3. Experiment 1A average duration looking at (i.e., 0) or near (i.e., 1–4) of the unexp
to noticers.3.2.2. Eye movements
Participants from Experiment 1B (when no US appeared) were
compared to eyes-moving participants from Experiment 1A (when
the US did appear). Data from three participants was discarded
due to poor recording. For the remaining seven participants, gaze
location at each point in time on trials 3 and 5 (i.e., the critical trials)
was compared to the location and time at which the US appeared
during Experiment 1A. The average gaze distance from where the
USwouldhaveappeareddidnotdiffer signiﬁcantly fromExperiment
1A on trial 5 (no US: M = 10.7, SD = 1.9; US present: M = 11.0,
SD = 1.6; t(33) = 0.51, p = .615, CI95 [1.1, 1.8]). For trial 3 gaze dis-
tancewas, paradoxically, actually slightly closer to the US trajectory
for participants who did not have the US appear onscreen (no US:
M = 10.4, SD = 1.6; US present: M = 11.7, SD = 1.4; t(33) = 2.08,
p = .046, CI95 [0.0, 2.5]). On the ﬁnal full attention trial, when the
US did appear, the average gaze distance from the US was 4.1
(SD = 1.2), which again was not signiﬁcantly different to the full
attention trial in Experiment 1A, t(32) = 0.65, p = .520, CI95
[1.0, 2.0]. Similarly, there were no signiﬁcant differences in the
proportion of participants looking near the locations where the US
would have appeared during the critical trials (see Table 6), or their
gaze durations (see Fig. 4), when compared to Experiment 1A. There
was a nonsigniﬁcant trend where participants in Experiment 1B
spent slightly longer looking at or near the US location, even though
itdidnot actually appearonscreen. Finally, the timeatwhichobserv-
ers ﬁrst lookednear theUS locationwas comparable to bothnoticers
andnonnoticers fromExperiment 1A; around1500–1700 ms for the
ﬁrst critical trial and 1900–2200 ms for the second critical trial. This
strongly suggests that looking near or even at the US in Experiment
1Amay have occurred as a consequence of tracking bouncing items,
potentially for noticers as well as nonnoticers.
3.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 1B suggest that the presence of an
unexpected stimulus does not necessarily alter either observers’ected stimulus location on the ﬁrst and second critical trials, comparing nonnoticers
Table 5
Experiment 1B vs. 1A percentage of participants choosing each shape.
Shape choice No US (Exp. 1B) (%) US (Exp. 1A) (%) Signiﬁcance
A 10 3 p = .433
E 20 3 p = .142
F 10 29 p = .402
H 20 23 p = 1.000
X (correct) 20 16 p = 1.000
Y 10 10 p = 1.000
= 10 10 p = 1.000
+ (correct) 80 65 p = .458
Note: Fisher’s Exact Tests (2-sided) were calculated in SPSS because all comparisons
had at least one cell with an expected count less than 5.
Table 6
Experiment 1B vs. 1A percentage of participants looking at or near the unexpected
stimulus location.
No US (Exp. 1B) (%) US (Exp. 1A) (%) Signiﬁcance
Critical trial 1 (trial 3)
Looking at US 0 7 p = 1.000
Within 1 57 32 p = .383
Within 2 57 68 p = .670
Within 3 86 86 p = 1.000
Within 4 100 96 p = 1.000
Critical trial 2 (trial 5)
Looking at US 29 14 p = .576
Within 1 29 36 p = 1.000
Within 2 29 39 p = .689
Within 3 29 50 p = .415
Within 4 71 61 p = .689
Note: Fisher’s Exact Tests (2-sided) were calculated in SPSS because all comparisons
contained at least one cell with an expected value less than 5.
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mance. This suggests that the similarities between noticers’ and
nonnoticers’ eye movements in Experiment 1A may have been
due to participants tracking items other than the unexpected stim-
ulus. In other words, although some participants made saccades to-
wards the US, these were not unique or deliberate saccades.
Although we demonstrated that noticers and nonnoticers were
equally likely to make a saccade to the US, we also found that
the two groups performed equally well on the primary bounce-
counting task. It is possible that their vigilance tracking the bounc-
ing objects led their gaze to spatially overlap the trajectory of the
US across the screen. In this case, it may be that nonnoticers ‘‘sup-
pressed” the unexpected stimulus because it appeared near the at-
tended items, but this explanation does not offer any insight into
why some observers do notice the US under the same circum-
stances. Even more surprising is our ﬁnding that some noticers
did not actually ﬁxate directly on the US, which suggests that cov-
ert mechanisms play a key role in detection – and possibly rejec-
tion, in the case of nonnoticers – of unexpected objects in IB
paradigms.
Another interesting outcome of Experiment 1B was that pat-
terns of shape choices were identical regardless of whether an
unexpected stimulus actually appeared, suggesting that correct
shape choice in Experiment 1A was more likely to be the result
of educated guessing rather than implicit processing.4. Experiment 2
Although Experiment 1 provides some interesting insight into
the role of eye movements in IB for dynamic stimuli, it is limited
because so few participants looked directly at the US during critical
trials. Therefore we have not properly tested our original hypothe-sis that IB can occur even when participants ﬁxate directly on an
unexpected stimulus. One issue in our ﬁrst experiment was pri-
mary task demands: task performance was quite poor because
the items bounced so frequently. Participants who performed the
task diligently necessarily had to follow the same pattern of eye
movements, with little opportunity for deviation away from the at-
tended items. Further, the high perceptual load of the task yielded
very high rates of IB and consequently comparisons between notic-
ers and nonnoticers involved severely unequal groups with a very
small number of noticers. It has been well established that easier
tasks, which have lower perceptual load, yield signiﬁcantly lower
rates of IB (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Koivisto & Revonsuo,
2009; Neisser, 1979; Simons & Jensen, 2009; White & Aimola Da-
vies, 2008). The traditional explanation for such ﬁndings are that
under high perceptual load there are fewer attentional resources
available to be captured by an US, whereas in situations of lower
perceptual load more attentional resources are free to deal with
additional environmental stimuli. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we
modiﬁed the experimental stimuli to make the bounce-counting
task easier. This lower perceptual load was intended to decrease
rates of IB, thereby producing approximately equal proportions of
noticers and nonnoticers, as well as to allow for greater potential
variation in eye movements, if indeed it was the case in Experi-
ment 1 that participants simply did not have time to deviate their
overt attention from the bouncing white letters.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Fifty-ﬁve undergraduate students participated voluntarily for
course credit. Five participants were excluded due to: realizing the
experimental topic (2); participation in a previous experiment (1);
failure tonotice theUSunder full attention (1); andexperimenter er-
ror (1). The remaining 50 participants (68% female; Mage =
18.6 years, SD = 1.0) were evenly distributed across two experimen-
tal conditions. All participants provided informed consent and had
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
4.1.2. Apparatus, stimuli and procedure
The apparatus was the same as in Experiments 1A and 1B. The
trial structure and stimuli were highly similar to Experiment 1A,
with three major changes. First, the speed of the attended and
unattended objects was slowed so that each item bounced only
1–4 times per trial, with white items bouncing a total of 9–10
times per trial (M = 9.4, SD = 0.5). Secondly, the shapes of the unex-
pected objects were changed so that ‘A’ appeared on critical trial 1
and ‘=’ appeared on critical trial 2. These shapes were included be-
cause they were the two least-frequently chosen shapes in Exper-
iment 1A; therefore, if participants in the current experiment
guessed them as the US shape it would provide stronger evidence
that their choices were due to priming or implicit processing. A ‘+’
appeared on the full attention trial. The third major change was the
speed of the US, which was manipulated in two experimental con-
ditions. In the fast-US condition the stimulus entered at 5 s and
took approximately 5 s to cross the display, as in Experiment 1A,
but was much faster than the other items on screen. In the slow-
US condition the stimulus moved at a similar speed to other items
in the display and took approximately 9 s to cross the display,
entering at 5 s exiting prior to the ﬁnal bounce. The manipulation
was to determine whether there were pop-out effects for speed in
the fast-US condition because pilot studies in our lab indicated
that, in addition to the perceptual load of the bounce-counting
task, speed of the US relative to other items on screen might be
important. The experimental procedure was the same as the
eyes-moving condition in Experiment 1A, except that nonnoticers
were instructed to choose two shapes for the US from the forced-
Fig. 4. Experiment 1B average duration looking at (i.e., 0) or near (i.e., 1–4) of the unexpected stimulus (US) location on the ﬁrst and second critical trials, comparing when
the US did not appear (No US; Exp 1B) to when it did appear (US Present; Exp 1A).
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choices.1 This includes 14 participants wearing spectacles for who the eyetracker could not
be properly calibrated. Participants with spectacles were excluded from participating
in Experiment 1A and offered participation in alternative experiments.4.2. Results and discussion
4.2.1. Behavioral data
Overall, nearly half the participants noticed the US at least once.
Rates of noticing did not differ between the slow-US condition
(44%) and the fast-US condition (48%), v2(1, N = 50) = 0.08,
p = 1.000, 2-sided. This seems to suggest that relative speed of
the US is unimportant. However, it is worth noting that the US
was on screen for nearly twice as long in the slow-US condition
compared to the fast-US condition, which allowed participants
more opportunities for noticing, yet the two conditions yielded al-
most identical rates of IB overall. There was a trend for more par-
ticipants in the fast-US condition to notice the US on both critical
trials (see Table 7), but this was not signiﬁcant using Fisher’s Exact
Test, p = .069, 2-sided. Anecdotally, most noticers in the fast-US
condition perceived the US to be the same speed or even slower
than the other items on screen, even though it was actually faster.
Accuracy on the bounce-counting task was extremely high, with
all mean difference scores less than ±1. Thus, while our task was
not effective at varying perceptual load between experimental con-
ditions (i.e., slow-US vs. fast-US), we succeeded in our aim to de-
crease the perceptual load of the primary task, when compared
to Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1A, accuracy scores were com-
pared using a 2 (condition: slow-US vs. fast-US)  2 (IB: nonnotic-
ers vs. noticers) between-subjects ANOVA. There were no main
effects of condition or IB (see Table 8) but there was a signiﬁcant
interaction on the ﬁnal critical trial only whereby noticers in the
slow-US condition performed signiﬁcantly worse at bounce-
counting.
Approximately 26% of nonnoticers correctly guessed one of the
two US shapes (A and/or =), which is equivalent to chance (2:8).
The most commonly chosen shape was + (52%), followed by F
(30%), X (30%), E (26%), Y (22%) and H (15%). The two US shapes
were actually the least popular choices (= 15%; A 11%). Nearly half
the nonnoticers (48%) reported that their shape choices were based
on what they thought was most likely to appear, typically because
the shapes were perceived as ‘‘most similar” to the expected items.
A further 15% guessed randomly and 15% based their decision on
‘‘gut feelings” and what ‘‘seemed familiar”. This conﬁrms the pos-
sibility raised by our Experiment 1B results, namely that responses
provided in a forced-choice situation are susceptible to educatedguesses and therefore do not reveal implicit processing or priming
effects.4.2.2. Eye movements
Data were screened and analyzed using the same procedures as
Experiments 1A and 1B; 19 participants were discarded due to
poor recording.1 Of the remaining 31 participants, 7 noticed the
US on the ﬁrst critical trial and 9 noticed on the second critical trial.
Average gaze distance was compared using a 2 (condition: slow-US
vs. fast-US)  2 (IB: nonnoticers vs. noticers) between-subjects ANO-
VA. Consistent with Experiment 1A, there were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences in average gaze distance on either the ﬁrst critical trial,
F(3, 27) = 0.18, p = .912, g2 = .02, or the second critical trial,
F(3, 27) = 0.22, p = .884, g2 = .02. The average gaze distance from
the US was 11.5 (SD = 1.8) on the ﬁrst critical trial, 10.4 (SD = 2.0)
on the second critical trial and 4.7 (SD = 2.0) on the full attention
trial. As in Experiments 1A and 1B, nearly all participants overtly
tracked the US for at least part of the full attention trial.
Using the criteria established in Experiment 1A, nearly all partic-
ipants looked near the US on both critical trials and several partici-
pants looked directly at the US (see Table 9). Noticers were slightly
more likely to look at or near the US location, however the only sig-
niﬁcant difference in rates of looking was on the ﬁrst critical trial,
when fast-US noticers were more likely to look directly at the US
than nonnoticers in the same condition. Similarly, there was a gen-
eral trend for noticers to spend slightly longer looking near the US
on both the ﬁrst critical trial (see Fig. 5) and the second critical trial
(see Fig. 6). Although the US appeared for nearly twice as long in the
slow-US condition, participants did not spend any longer looking at
it, as shown inFigs. 5 and6.Averageduration spent lookingatornear
the US was analyzed for each distance using 2 (condition: slow-US
vs. fast-US)  2 (IB: nonnoticers vs. noticers) between-subjects AN-
OVA. Theseanalyses revealeda statistically signiﬁcant effect only for
duration spent looking within 1 of the US the second critical trial,
F(3, 11) = 10.58, p = .001, g2 = .74, indicating a main effect whereby
noticers spent longer looking within 1 of the US than nonnoticers,
F(1, 11) = 15.68, p = .002, g2 = .59, as well as an interaction between
condition and IB, F(1, 11) = 5.40, p = .040, g2 = .59. Themain effect of
IB status was close to signiﬁcance for duration spent looking within
2 of the US, F(1, 21) = 3.34, p = .088, g2 = .14, but not forwithin 3 of
the US, F(1, 24) = 2.28, p = .144, g2 = .09. Although the analyseswere
Table 7
Experiment 2 rates of noticing the unexpected stimulus, by condition.
Experimental condition Overall
(%)
Slow-US (%) Fast-US (%)
Noticed?
Trial 3 only (ﬁrst critical trial) 16 20 18
Trial 5 only (second critical trial 24 4 14
Both trials 3 and 5 (all critical trials) 4 24 14
Total noticers 44 48 46
Inattentional blindness 56 52 54
986 V. Beanland, K. Pammer / Vision Research 50 (2010) 977–988not signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst critical trial, a similar pattern of results
was observed for the fast-US condition (indicated on the right side
of Fig. 5) but not the slow-US condition (see Fig. 5, left).
There was no relationship between looking at the US and cor-
rectly identifying its shape. On both critical trials, none of the non-
noticers who looked directly at the US correctly identiﬁed the
shape using the forced-choice sheet. Further, on the ﬁrst critical
trial 29% of noticers incorrectly identiﬁed the US shape despite
having ﬁxated on it during the trial. (These participants were nev-
ertheless classed as noticers because they could correctly describe
other attributes of the stimulus, including color and motion trajec-
tory.) On the second critical trial all noticers correctly identiﬁed the
US shape, even though only 50% (combining both experimental
conditions) directly ﬁxated on it.5. General discussion
The present study was one of the ﬁrst to employ an eyetracker
to record eye movements during a dynamic inattentional blindness
paradigm. The results conﬁrm and expand on the ﬁnding from pre-Table 8
Experiment 2 bounce-counting mean accuracy (and standard deviations), by condition.
Slow-US Fast-US
Nonnoticers Noticers Nonnoticers Noticers
Trial 2 (control) 0.2 (1.1) 0.2 (1.1) 0.2 (0.9) 0.0 (0.9)
Trial 3 (critical) 0.1 (0.7) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.6) 0.1 (0.8)
Trial 4 (control) 0.2 (0.6) 0.0 (0.4) 0.2 (0.4) 0.2 (0.6)
Trial 5 (critical) 0.2 (0.6) 1.0 (1.0) 0.3 (0.7) 0.1 (0.4)
Note: Scores are difference scores (actual – reported bounces) so lower scores indicate gre
negative values indicate overreporting the bounce-count. Between-Subjects tests were c
* p < .05.
Table 9
Experiment 2 Percentage of Participants Looking at or Near the Unexpected Stimulus, by
Slow-USa
Nonnoticers (%) Noticers (%) Signiﬁc
Critical trial 1 (trial 3)
Looking at US 27 0 p = 1.00
Within 1 47 100 p = .216
Within 2 80 100 p = 1.00
Within 3 87 100 p = 1.00
Within 4 93 100 p = 1.00
Critical trial 2 (trial 5)
Looking at US 15 60 p = .099
Within 1 46 80 p = .314
Within 2 77 100 p = .522
Within 3 92 100 p = 1.00
Within 4 92 100 p = 1.00
Note: Fisher’s Exact Tests (2-sided) were calculated in SPSS because all comparisons con
a n = 18.
b n = 13.
* p < .05.vious experiments that inattentional blindness can occur even
when observers move their eyes to directly ﬁxate on an object
(Koivisto et al., 2004; Memmert, 2006). Participants in the current
experiment were free to move their eyes across the whole display,
and thus free to make a saccade to the unexpected object to bring it
within the focus of attention. Compared to noticers, observers who
failed to notice the unexpected object were for the most part
equally likely to make an eye movement towards the object. We
found a strong tendency for noticers to spend longer than nonno-
ticers looking directly at or within 2 of the unexpected stimulus in
Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1A. It is not clear whether a
longer gaze duration is the cause or effect of noticing: noticers
may have been able to report the stimulus because they spent
longer looking at it, or they may have looked for longer because
they consciously noticed it. The latter explanation seems more
plausible given the results of Experiment 1A, however one limita-
tion in interpreting our results from Experiment 1A is that the
numbers of noticers and nonnoticers were unequal, which prohib-
ited reliable comparisons. Nevertheless, it is clear that in Experi-
ment 2 the primary task was relatively easy for most
participants, which may have allowed noticers to simultaneously
attend to both the bounce-counting task and the unexpected stim-
ulus, whereas more demanding tasks do not afford the same
opportunity. Overall, however, it appears that eye movements do
not predict the incidence of IB, since in both Experiments 1A and
2 there were participants who detected the US without looking di-
rectly at it, as well as participants who looked directly at the US but
could not consciously report it.
Lavie (1995) proposed the perceptual load model of attention,
arguing that the degree to which irrelevant distractors or unex-
pected items capture attention varies depending on the perceptual
load requirements of the primary task. Tasks involving high per-Tests of Between-Subjects Effects
Condition IB Condition  IB
F(1,46) = 0.05, p = .831 F(1,46) = 0.94, p = .336 F(1,46) = 0.18, p = .671
F(1,46) = 0.02, p = .888 F(1,46) = 0.03, p = .856 F(1,46) = 0.07, p = .787
F(1,46) = 0.14, p = .713 F(1,46) = 0.49, p = .486 F(1,46) = 0.63, p = .432
F(1,46) = 2.59, p = .115 F(1,46) = 2.24, p = .141 F(1,46) = 5.69, p = .021*
ater accuracy. Positive values indicate underreporting the number of bounces, while
alculated in SPSS using Univariate General Linear Model.
Condition.
Fast-USb
ance Nonnoticers (%) Noticers (%) Signiﬁcance
0 22 100 p = .021*
44 100 p = .105
0 56 100 p = .228
0 56 100 p = .228
0 56 100 p = .228
22 33 p = 1.000
33 67 p = .523
78 100 p = 1.000
0 89 100 p = 1.000
0 89 100 p = 1.000
tained at least one cell with an expected value less than 5.
Fig. 5. Experiment 2 average duration looking at (i.e., 0) or near (i.e., 1–4) of the unexpected stimulus location on the ﬁrst critical trial, comparing nonnoticers to noticers by
experimental condition.
Fig. 6. Experiment 2 average duration looking at (i.e., 0) or near (i.e., 1–4) of the unexpected stimulus location on the second critical trial, comparing nonnoticers to noticers
by experimental condition.
V. Beanland, K. Pammer / Vision Research 50 (2010) 977–988 987ceptual load leave fewer remaining attentional resources that can
detect and process distractors. Conversely, low perceptual load
tasks have greater attentional resources remaining for processing
other stimuli, such as distractors, and in these cases irrelevant or
unexpected items will be processed automatically. The perceptual
load model was demonstrated to predict occurrence of IB in a static
paradigm (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007). Consistent with the re-
sults of Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007), we found that rates of
IB dropped with perceptual load of the primary task, from 81% in
Experiment 1A to 54% in Experiment 2. However, in the current
experiments our index of attentional capture was whether observ-
ers made a saccade towards the US. Consequently, it could be the
case that in Experiment 1 unique eye movements were not made
to the US because primary task demands on overt attention were
too high; eye movements that were spatially coexistent with the
US were likely to coincide with participants moving their eyes to
track primary task items. The fact that several participants con-
sciously noticed the US and could fully identify it without making
a unique saccade to it indicates that US identiﬁcation must be able
to occur covertly, especially in cases where task demands prohibit
observers from moving their eyes to the US. Eye movements may
be prohibited either because participants are required to maintain
ﬁxation, or because they are tracking other items, as demonstrated
in Experiment 2 when lower attentional demands of the primary
task allowed participants to direct overt attention and make un-ique saccades to the US. The crucial ﬁnding of interest, however,
is that overt attention is clearly neither necessary nor sufﬁcient
for detecting an unexpected stimulus in an inattentional blindness
paradigm. The bulk of evidence investigating covert visual atten-
tion has looked at effects of cuing and attentional orienting (e.g.,
Posner, 1980). Research using cuing paradigms has suggested that
attention can be drawn covertly to a peripheral cue or target when
it possesses salient or unique properties (e.g., Carrasco & McElree,
2001; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Franconeri, Holling-
worth, & Simons, 2005; Jonides, 1981; Kim & Cave, 1999; Müller
& Rabbitt, 1989). The current study adds to knowledge in this area
by demonstrating that in an IB paradigm, unexpected stimuli can
be identiﬁed covertly with no resultant drop in primary task
performance.
If we accept that noticers can process the US covertly, which is
consistent with previous research that prohibited participants
from making eye movements (e.g., Most et al., 2000, 2001, 2005),
this raises questions about precisely what differentiates noticers
from nonnoticers. It is possible that nonnoticers do not perceive
unexpected stimuli because they do not direct their attention, cov-
ert or overt, to it – they do not see it because they do not look at it.
This seems unsupportable, though, given that some noticers fail to
‘‘look” at objects that they can nevertheless report ‘‘seeing” and
also that some nonnoticers do in fact look directly at the unex-
pected object. Based on this we must at least consider the possibil-
988 V. Beanland, K. Pammer / Vision Research 50 (2010) 977–988ity that nonnoticers may process the stimuli to a similar extent to
noticers, although it fails to reach conscious awareness. Rather
than IB being a state of ‘‘failing to see” an unexpected stimulus,
we propose that nonnoticers may in fact simply be more efﬁcient
at rejecting stimuli that are deemed unimportant to the primary
task. There is potential to resolve this question with recourse to
implicit processing measures, however to date attempts to do so
have produced conﬂicting results. Mack and Rock (1998) demon-
strated that participants who failed to notice an unexpected word
stimulus still showed evidence of priming in a subsequent word-
stem completion task. This suggests that some degree of atten-
tional coding may occur for nonnoticers, which may in turn allow
them to reject the US as irrelevant.
A key issue here is the methods used to assess potential implicit
processing. While some previous research suggested that nonno-
ticers could indirectly identify the unexpected stimulus using a
forced-choice array of possibilities (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008;
Mack & Rock, 1998), this was not supported by our current results
or other previous research (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Mack
et al., 1992; Rock et al., 1992). However our results from Experi-
ment 1B and Experiment 2 suggest that participants use logic
and deduction in order to choose which shape they consider would
be most likely to appear. This means they are more likely to guess
correctly when the unexpected stimulus is the option perceived as
most similar to the other items on screen (i.e., + in a ﬁeld of Ls and
Ts). This could explain the seemingly conﬂicting results from
forced-choice tasks in past IB experiments. More sensitive priming
measures are required in experiments that use dynamic stimuli,
rather than forced-choice paradigms, in order to determine
whether implicit processing occurs for unnoticed stimuli. If under
high perceptual load, nonnoticers failed to make unique saccades
towards the US (as in Experiment 1 here) but showed evidence
of priming, this would support the notion that nonnoticers are cov-
ertly processing unexpected stimuli before rejecting or suppressing
them. This also raises the possibility that nonnoticers are actually
employing more efﬁcient attentional processes, by rapidly reject-
ing or screening out irrelevant items. Little research has been done
on individual differences in IB, since most studies have employed
only one critical trial per participant (see Mack and Rock (1998),
for a discussion). However, it appears that aptitude in the primary
task does not inﬂuence likelihood of experiencing IB (Simons & Jen-
sen, 2009). Therefore other cognitive factors relating to attention,
which have not been explored in the IB research to date, are likely
to determine what people ‘‘see” regardless of where they are
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